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Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) keep a strict control over users ac-
cessing the networks by means of the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM).
This module grants the user to access the network, by performing the reg-
istration and authentication of the user's device. Without a valid SIM
module and a successful authentication, mobile devices are not granted
access and, hence, they are not allowed to inject any trac in the mobile
infrastructure.
Nevertheless, in this thesis we describe an attack to the security of a mo-
bile network allowing an unauthenticated malicious mobile device to inject
trac in the mobile operator's infrastructure. We show that using a few
hundreds of malicious devices without any SIM module it is possible to
inject high levels of signalling trac in the mobile infrastructure, causing
signicant service degradation up to a full-
edged Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack.
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Mobile phones are one of the most pervasively deployed technology in the world and
cellular networks have reached worldwide coverage. On one hand, the evolution
from early analog networks to recent 4G LTE solutions has allowed operators to
oer new services to their customers. On the other hand, the same evolution has
pushed new needs into the customers; such needs have evolved from simple phone
calls and Short Message Service (SMS) to internet connections and high speed
access to streaming data.
The availability of smartphones with wide touch-screen displays as well as the
always-on, high bandwidth IP connectivity have generated a growing set of services
and applications ranging from e-mail to remote banking, from e-shopping to music
streaming, from video on demand to social geo-localized networks. In turn, the
ease of use and the availability of a rich a set of functionalities have instilled into
users a growing familiarity and a sense of dependency. This dependency does not
exist only for leisurable activities, but has a denite onset also in business and crit-
ical tasks. In particular, the last years have seen a signicant penetration in govern
agencies and public bodies. To this aim, we can cite the recent security certica-
tion of Android smartphones by the US Department of Defense [28] that allows the
deployment of Dell hardware with Froyo (Android OS v2.2) in the Pentagon. A
second example is the adoption of tablet PCs (Apple iPad) by the Chicago hospital
and the Loyola University Medical Center in Maywood. Finally, several research
projects are focusing on the deployment of health-care services onto the tablet PC
platform with widely goals from simple access to medical records [10], to reminders
for medication intake [29], to decision support systems [19], to automatic recog-
nition of pathological states [24], to systems for memory support [20]. For these
reasons, mobile networks security analysis should emphasize availability along with
condentiality and integrity.
However, the introduction of new technologies cannot be decoupled from the
support to legacy ones, since i) a high number of older terminals are still ac-
tive, and ii) some manufactures keep producing 2G-only phones to satisfy low-end
market. For these reasons, each new radio access technology has to be deployed
alongside existing ones, leading to hybrid architectures where some network com-
ponents are shared among dierent technological infrastructures. This condition
is driving operators toward single Radio Access Network (RAN) solutions, causing
a cellular site to broadcast signals related to up to 3 dierent technologies in 5
1dierent frequency bands. Such a composite network architecture co-exists with a
design traditionally focused on making mobile networks smarter and smarter, while
keeping devices crowding their cells as \dumb" as possible [13, 27]. Today's smart-
phones are far more intelligent and powerful than their predecessors. However,
networks still don't prot from their enhanced processing power; on the contrary
they assume the lowest possible capability in order to maintain compatibility with
older devices. This assumption results in higher signaling trac levels between
network nodes1, more complex system management and the early consumption
of computational resources, even before ensuring whether requesting device is le-
gitimate or not. This dierence in workload between server and requester is a
vulnerability that, sometimes, may be exploited to mount a particular type of
attack called Denial-of-Service (DoS). Despite this terms refers to very dierent
scenarios, having as a common factor the attempt to make a service unavailable to
intended users, a typical DoS consider an attacker 
ooding a target device, i.e. the
server, with cheap and seemingly-legitimate requests. The aected equipment has
no means to identify and discard malicious requests so it starts to clog up trying to
keep up with the increased load, thus not being able to serve all genuine requests,
which results in a perceived service outage by the user.
The complexity of the network structure may hide both unknown and known
vulnerabilities. For an interesting survey on threats undermining the world of
mobile telecommunication, the reader can refer to [8]. For the case of known
vulnerabilities, the true impact on the mobile phone network may have not been
suciently assessed in a way that is similar to what happens in mobile OSes [7].
To this aim, in this thesis we extend the work by Khan et al. [18] focusing on the
attach phase of GSM/UMTS protocol and we show that it is possible to mount a
complete attack even without hijacking or controlling a large number of user IDs
recognized by the network. To achieve our goal, we study the amount of signalling
trac that a dedicated SIM-less device can inject into an operator's core network,
by pushing air interface to its design limit. Such activity may obviously disable
the signalling capabilities of the cells under attack, causing a local DoS similar
to the one that can be achieved with a radio jammer; however, to reach a very
critical level of disruption, the generated trac may be targeted at the HLR, i.e.
the database containing information on mobile subscribers. Since this database
is a critical component of the core network, an outage of its functionality may
cause an interruption of other mobile services too, nally resulting in a whole mo-
bile network DoS. In our study, we leverage the HLR performance measurements
conducted by Traynor et al. [26], showing that it is possible to achieve a su-
cient service degradation using just GSM technology but, taking advantage also of
UMTS and combining network elements load conveniently, it is possible to reduce
drastically the number of needed devices, still maintaining the SIM-less feature.
This results, although not tested in the real networks, are derived from measure-
1http://connectedplanetonline.com/mss/4g-world/the-lte-signaling-challenge-
0919/ (accessed in May 2013).
2ments and simulations taken from the available literature as well as theoretical
estimations based on protocol descriptions and network behaviour; moreover they
represent an actual double improvement if compared to the state of the art: in
fact, before our study, attacks with the same disruptive potential were described
as requiring both i) more device involved and ii) having access to valid SIM cards.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follow:
￿ in Chapter 1 we provide a description of the architecture of GSM/UMTS
networks;
￿ in Chapter 2 we analyse the state of the art in the eld and we discuss the
results obtained in previous related works;
￿ in Chapter 3 we describe how it is possible to launch an HLR DoS attack
with a number of SIMless devices;
￿ nally, in Chapter 4, we provide some concluding remarks and we describe
the future direction of our study.
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GSM/UMTS network description
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard (2G) was initially de-
signed to carry eciently circuit switched voice communications in full duplex, with
a main advantage over previous analog generation: all the processing happens in
the digital domain. The standard protocol set expanded over time with addictions
that, from Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) point of view, require just a soft-
ware upgrade on already deployed hardware; consumers, instead, need modern and
more powerful devices to experiment newly oered services. The rst addiction to
GSM has been General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) that introduced data deliv-
ery alongside of voice communications, in both circuit switched and |the more
ecient| packet switched mode. Apart from calls GPRS permits data connection
throughputs roughly ranging in the 9{170kbps interval; augmenting this modest
numbers has been the main target of the second GSM enhancement: Enhanced
Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE). EDGE is a backward-compatible exten-
sion to GSM/GPRS network that introduce new coding and transmission tech-
niques thus allowing for data rates up to 470kbps.
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is a major update to
GSM standard which worth it the third generation (3G) epithet. Instead of other
GSM updates like GPRS and EDGE, UMTS requires new base station equipments
and new frequency band for its deployment. In respect to 2G technologies it
is characterized by greater spectral eciency and higher throughput bandwidth
ranging from 348kbps of rst UMTS release, called R99, to actual 42Mbps of
HSPA+. Bandwidth increment is also what drives marketing during early stages
of this new technology; great emphasis has been posed by MNOs on services like
mobile TV and video calling but their eort has not really been appreciated by end
user: in fact, nowadays the main utilization of 3G networks is for plain internet
access. UMTS introduction highly aects the radio access portion of the network,
the core part, on the other hand, remained the same as in GSM/GPRS in order to
facilitate the switch from old technologies to the new one.
A typical GSM/UMTS Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) consist at least
of the infrastructures depicted in gure 1.1. It is mainly split up in three dierent
portions:
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Figure 1.1: GSM and UMTS standard network representation.
￿ the Mobile Station (MS) or User Equipment (UE);
￿ the Radio Access Network (RAN) which is called GSM/EDGE Radio Access
Network (GERAN) or UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN)
based on the used technology;
￿ the Core Network (CN) or Network Switching Subsystem (NSS) with fully
separated packet and circuit switched domains.
1.1 The Mobile Station part
MS may be a mobile phone or a mobile broadband modem with appropriate pro-
tocol stack and capabilities as dened by specications. Every device is also
marked with a worldwide unique identier, called International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI), that MNOs check against the Equipment Identity Register (EIR),
i.e. the database of stolen or out-of-requisites hardware, and, in case of a positive
match, banish the faulty equipment from the network.
Nonetheless whichever device is used to connect to the network, there will be
a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) in it. SIMs |or Universal SIM (USIM) in
UMTS| are smart cards usually referred to as the furthest extension of mobile
operator's network; it securely stores user identity, represented by the International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), and its related secret key, as long as the algo-
rithms needed during the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) phase.
The IMSI is a delicate information because, being unique, allows an eaves-
dropper to track an user during its movements leveraging unencrypted signalling
messages like paging. For this reason, during the preliminary messages exchange
61.2. THE RADIO ACCESS NETWORK PART
after switch on, the user is marked with another identier, called Temporary Mo-
bile Subscriber Identity (TMSI), that has just a local validity, is often refreshed
with a new one, and is used for every communication from and toward the network
thus reaching an high degree of anonymity.
1.2 The Radio Access Network part
MSs communicate over air interface with a cell tower that, based on the technology,
is called either BTS or Node B. This is the rst element composing the RAN, in
GSM it has minimum functionality apart from physical layer transmission but,
with Node Bs, the trend is toward adding more and more logic to lower response
times. A typical BTS/Node B serves three 120￿sectors |also called cells| by
means of one or more antennas per sector; antennas are powered by ampliers
that gets their pilot signals from one or more baseband modules which are nally
connected to the transceiver. Cell towers are grouped together in tens or hundreds
and are connected with either a Base Station Controller (BSC) or a Radio Network
Controller (RNC). These two devices are the main responsible for the following
functions:
radio resource management: this means channel assignments and release as
well as MS paging;
mobility management: that, at this level, means inter-BTS/Node B handover;
encryption of user data: these two equipments are the exact point where user
informations are encrypted before being sent over the radio interface.
The main dierence between BSC and RNC, apart from the protocol they serve,
consists in the presence of the IuR interface that allows RNC-to-RNC communica-
tions: this UMTS novelty, along with the air protocol peculiarities, permits the soft
handover, that is, a feature where a cell phone can be simultaneously connected to
two or more cells, in order to maximize received signal quality.
1.3 The Core Network part
Each BSC and RNC has a couple of connections toward the core network: one
linking the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) carrying packet switched data,
the other linking the Mobile Switching Center (MSC) and transporting circuit
switched informations. This division come from the fact that GPRS, with its
data delivery capabilities, has been a posthumous addendum to the NSS. Both
SGSN and MSC act as switching and end point for end-to-end connections it
their own domains; they manage hand-overs between dierent BSC/RNC as well
as authentication checking and charging functions. The most valuable operation
of these equipments, however, is mobility management: they keep track of MS
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movements inside their service area and locate it whenever required. To carry
out this operation an auxiliary database called Visitor Location Register (VLR) is
used: it contains the user identity along with an indication of its current location
at the BSC/RNC-level, and a pointer to the MNO's main user record which is
contained in another database called Home Location Register (HLR).
The HLR maintains a record for each mobile phone subscriber with details like
the telephone number, IMSI and secret key |the same contained in the SIM|,
call blocking and forwarding rules and a pointer to the most updated VLR the
user is known to be roaming on. HLR is a core component for the networks
because it has to be queried for phone call and SMS delivery, billing procedures
and authentication: in this last function it is supported by the Authentication
Center (AuC) which calculates challenges and responses that will then be sent to
the MSC/SGSN for actual user validation.
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Survey of mobile network attacks
Cellular networks seem unaected by the same threats that, almost daily, come up
in the newspapers regarding other types of widely spread systems like the Internet.
Nonetheless, even if a large security outbreak has not already made its way through
the news, mobile operators' network security has been studied in the literature
for quite a long time. Initially, most of the attention of researchers was focused
on condentiality and integrity of data traveling over the wireless portion of the
system; however, in more recent works, the problem of the actual availability of
the services provided by the network, both in the wireless segment and in the core
network segment, has gained popularity, becoming the focus of dierent studies.
2.1 Jamming attacks
The simplest way to prevent a mobile network from oering its services is using
a radio jammer. Xu et al. [30] dene four jamming models diering in type and
duration of the emitted signal and study the feasibility of detecting such attacks.
They show that a jammer always injecting regular data, called deceptive, is the
most eective one but the random version, which alternates between sleeping and
transmitting, may represent a valid alternative taking energy conservation in con-
sideration. However, even with smart, protocol-specic, jamming algorithms like
[23], the intrinsic trade-o between nite power supply and continuous transmission
make this kind of attack limited both in space and time.
From a detection point of view Xu et al. [30] conclude that a single performance
indicator like, for example, signal strength or packet delivery ratio, is not enough
to spot an ongoing jamming attack: thus they dene two algorithms based on
classication and consistency check phases that mix together multiple indicators
in order to conclude the presence of a jammer.
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2.2 Smartphone: the mobile network outlier
Moving from physical towards upper layers increases both the complexity of the
attack and the size of the involved network segment. In order to be able to prove
higher layer attacks possible, however, researchers have had to wait for a device
with extensible capabilities, a kind of device that made its rst market appearance
in 2000 but actually had a signicant deployment only in 2007: the smartphone1.
Until late 1990s mobile phones had only basic phone features so the user had com-
plete control over what the terminals were doing. This fact, however, has been
subverted by the rst iPhone release in 2007 and, more specically, by the intro-
duction of Apple App Store. The iPhone, in fact, as all the smartphones marketed
today, ran an operating system over which a series of applications oered an open
ended set of end-user functionalities (e.g., personal information management, e-
mail access, web browsing and much more). Thus users, in a way that is very
similar to using traditional PCs, may extend the default application set through
vendors' specic application stores where new service-enabling third-party applica-
tions can be bought, downloaded and installed. The advent of application-enabled
phones and centralized software distribution systems attracted the attention both
of attackers2 and of security researchers. In particular, the research community
has proved that the open feature set nature of the smartphone makes it the device
capable of massive and distribute mobile network attacks [9].
2.2.1 The disruptive potential of smartphone botnets
Past Internet security studies prove that in order to mount a DoS attack a botnet is
the tool that provides the most suitable characteristics; however, mobile networks
have constraints and peculiarities that should be taken into consideration. In
particular, Fleizach et al. [12] study how \fast" malware may propagate using
two fake vulnerabilities, aecting VOIP and MMS reception. They model both a
single mobile operator's network topology and dierent contact graph distributions
showing that, by leveraging the generally distributed architecture of VOIP services,
a VOIP infection can reach 70% of users in around 4 hours generating major
congestion eects on the RNC-to-SGSN link (see previous section). On the other
hand, MMS infection spreads at a much slower pace because it is constrained by a
few centralized servers that act as bottlenecks.
Creating a mobile phone botnet is generally more challenging than doing it
with traditional Internet nodes; this derives both from the fact that mobile phones
nodes are usually less apt at running daemon processes and to the fact that most
of the time mobile phones are connected to the internet with a private IP address.
Furthermore, as Mulliner and Seifert [21] analyze in their study the command and
control (C&C) part has non-negligible set of specic challenges. As they point out,
1en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartphone (accessed in May 2013).
2http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/04/family-of-badnews-malware-in-google-
play-downloaded-up-to-9-million-times/ (accessed on May 2013).
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mobile phones environment forces botnet master to face challenges like limited run
time, communication costs and absence of public IP address: all of these specic
problems have to be addressed in order to keep the malware concealed to the
user. To identify methods to overcome the above mentioned problems, the authors
identify three communication approaches: the rst based on SMS-only messaging,
the second based on IP packet delivery in a peer-to-peer topology and the third
based on a SMS-HTTP hybrid design; their analysis allows to conclude that the
last one is the most promising and dangerous botnet C&C structure, and it also
outlines some communication strategies that would help in keeping low bills.
An attacker capable of controlling a botnet can use infected devices for multiple
purposes. Spam delivery is a rst possible use. Sending junk or marketing messages
through SMS is one of the easiest thing, and the attacker can even get a direct
revenue stream by forcing clients to make calls or send SMS to premium price
services [11]. Another type of attack stems from the fact that MNOs and users
identify a telephone number |that is a SIM card| with a real person identity.
Exploiting such a trust link, coupled with the possibility of registering whatever
input or conversation make remote wiretapping and identity theft or spoong [13,
11] straightforward for an attacker. A malicious entity may also try to kick mobile
network elements out of service. As an example, Guo et al. [13] predicted that a few
dozens of subverted smartphones, served by the same base station, can jeopardize
its availability by making no-answer calls and thus saturating provisioned voice
channels. If phones are not located in the same place, authors outlined that it
is still possible to put call aggregation points to a halt by means of a distributed
denial of service: the number of needed controlled devices is indeed higher than the
one needed in the previous case, but, due to the fact that PSTN, cellular switches
and call centres are designed for a limited Busy Hour Call Attempts, the attack is
still feasible.
Later studies still focusing on DoS attacks show that it is possible to achieve the
needed level of service degradation in a more ecient way: instead of consuming
trac (or user-plane) channels, an attacker may try to 
ood control channels which
are usually separated from trac ones and signicantly more limited in terms
of available bandwidth. One of the rst work in this direction is from Traynor
et al. [25]. In a strict sense, the attack described here doesn't use a botnet
but, in a broader sense, every mobile phone is an accomplice because what it
has to do is just receiving incoming requests. They show how the interconnection
between the mobile network and the Internet via, for example, on-line SMS delivery
capabilities, may be exploited by an attacker continuously sending text messages
to an especially crafted hit-list of telephone numbers. Such a data 
ood will keep
the GGSM Standalone Dedicated Control Channel (SDCCH) |responsible for
authentication and setup of both voice calls and text messaging| saturated with
text messages, thus unavailable to accept or delivery any voice call, even with
available trac channels: to prove eectiveness of this type of attacks authors
simulate that approximately 580kbps of injected SMS trac is enough to deny
service in the whole Manhattan area.
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Another study from Traynor et al. [27] focuses on the GPRS network and
characterizes two dierent types of radio resource exhaustion attacks targeting
data connection setup and tear-down mechanisms. In the setup attack authors
continue exploring control channel depletion eects but, this time, they analyze
the Random Access Channel (RACH). RACH is shared by all mobile terminals
attempting to establish connections with the network and, in order to minimize
contention, its access is mediated through slotted-ALOHA protocol. During the
attack, neighboring phones are forced to continuously begin short-lived data con-
nection, thus accessing RACH and 
ooding it. The authors nd out that, for the
city of Manhattan, 3Mbps of malicious trac cause a data and voice connection
blocking probability of 65% and, along with that, they point out how attacking
data realm could have aect on voice realm too because of the single shared control
channel. This fact is extremely interesting and it is important to notice that even
outside the data connection realm there are multiple ways to force a mobile phone
to access the RACH, thus achieving similar results: the data setup exploited in [27]
is just an instance of this eect although it is possibly the one that is most easily
kept concealed to the phone owners. Dierently from the setup attack, the attack
targeting the tear-down mechanism is entirely contained in the data portion of the
mobile network, thus it cannot aect the voice network and it can only cause a DoS
in the data network. When a new data 
ow with the user equipment is established,
the base station assigns to it a 5-bit Temporary Flow Identier (TFI) used to mark
all packets belonging to the same 
ow. Once the last packet has been delivered,
the base station can release the TFI; however, this event takes place after a 5
seconds delay in order to take into account minor variations in data inter-arrival
times. Exploiting this delay a malicious attacker can exhaust all TFIs. A possible
example implementation of this attack requires a rogue Internet server answering
32 requests coming from the same neighbourhood with 1-byte-packets sent every
5 seconds. As in the case of the SDDCH attack described before, there is no need
for compromised phones.
2.3 Darken the transparent network: attacking
Core equipments
A signicant advancement in the analysis of mobile network security has been
achieved when researchers found a way to attack core network elements, proving
that network-wide service deterioration possible. Khan et al. and Kambourakis et
al. [18, 17] examine UMTS security architecture nding some protocols 
aws that
can be used to delete, modify or replay some unauthenticated or not integrity pro-
tected messages. This 
aws may permit revealing user identities (IMSI), launching
DoS attacks against both user phones and network nodes or impersonating the
network acting as a man-in-the-middle. These studies, however, do not detail the
amount of resources needed to mount a successful DoS attack. An attempt to eval-
uate the amount of resources needed can be found in the work by Traynor et al.
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[26]. The rst step is a performance characterization of dierent HLR devices in
dierent network deployments. The authors identify the transaction most suitable
to mount an HLR DoS attack, searching for a compromise between resource con-
sumption and execution time. By means of a simulation of the network behaviour
they nd that about 11750 infected devices submitting an \insert call forwarding"
every 4.7 seconds are sucient to reduce HLR throughput of legitimate trac by
more than 93%.
Concluding this summary of works related to DoS attacks in mobile cellular
networks, it is interesting to notice the \big picture" that [13] and [27] try to draw.
Currently studied mobile network DoS attacks roots their cause in the fact that
this networks were designed to manage trac with highly predictable properties
but, once connected to the Internet, such constraints hold no more. The Internet
was designed with architectural assumptions that are in complete opposition from
the ones adopted for cellular networks; this creates a disparity in the eort spent to
set up and tear down a connection, necessarily leading to a bottle neck. Moreover
mobile terminals have been traditionally considered dumb because of their limited
battery life and computational power: this second assumption, however, holds no
more in the smartphone era and its underestimation both increases network design
complexity and forces core elements to early commit far more resources than those
needed by an unauthenticated device. In the following sections we show how it is
possible to leverage these facts to greatly reduce the amount of resources needed
to mount a successful DoS attack against cellular networks.
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Squeezing radio access protocols
Delivering informations over radio interfaces permits to reach an high number of
users without all the costs needed to lay out a physical cable to each costumer's
house. This costs reduction, however, comes with more challenging, and thus less
ecient, transmission methods than the wired counterpart. This ineciencies stem
mostly from the peculiarities of the transmission medium, but also from the need
to grant the main advantage that a wireless communication has compared with a
wired one, that is, mobility.
We put ourselves in an attacker's shoes that tries to 
ood a Public Land Mo-
bile Network (PLMN) with malicious requests asking whether wireless interface is
adequate for this purpose or not. In truth, from this point of view, ether may be
a good natured bottleneck that force the attacker to deploy an excessive number
of compromised devices before reaching his target, thus resulting in a worthless
investment.
3.1 Tracking users: the location update proce-
dure
Keeping track of the position of every mobile phone, while letting it move arbitrar-
ily inside the area of coverage, is one of the most critical functionality of a PLMN
and it is in charge to Mobility Management (MM) procedures. A mobile network
is made of cells but always knowing MS position at this level of detail would be
both impractical, for the resulting bloat of needed signalling, and useless, because
it would require much more MS transmission, even when not in use, thus depleting
battery faster. For this reason when the phone is not involved in any communica-
tion with the network, the network itself knows its position in a more approximate
way represented by two superimposed partitions of the set of cells called Location
Areas (LAs) and Routing Areas (RAs). Location Areas are a concept of circuit
switched domain: they are linked with a single MSC/VLR which, in turn, may
be responsible for multiple LAs. On the other hand Routing Areas are a packet
switching introduction so they are managed by SGSNs instead of MSCs: they are
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usually smaller than LAs, in order to accommodate the bursty nature of packet
trac, and each RA is fully contained inside only one LAs. To be thorough UMTS
introduced another area type, the UTRAN Registration Area (URA), which is not
tied with any LA or RA boundary and also allow overlapping between dierent
URAs: this area, however, come into play only in particular conditions out of our
interests, so it won't be mentioned further. Being inside a LA/RA couple, the
MSC1 MSC2
SSGN3 SSGN2 SSGN1
LA1
RA2 RA1
LA2 LA3
RA4 RA5 RA3
Figure 3.1: Relationship between dierent area types composing the RAN.
MS informs core network about its actual position using the location update pro-
cedure. This function requires as an input the user identity represented by the
IMSI or, more often, the last assigned (P-)TMSI; as an output, instead, it returns
a new (P-)TMSI, meaning that now the MS is attached to the network, that is,
the latter knows which core elements should be queried to deliver, for example, an
incoming phone call. On early deployment of GPRS the location update |also
known as attach| procedure should be repeated twice, one time for the Circuit
Switching (CS) domain and the other for the Packet Switching (PS); today in-
stead, given the advent of always-connected phones like smartphones, a combined
function has been introduced: at the cost of a single execution, allows for attach
to both domains, thus reducing wait times from power on to the rst packet sent.
Location updates are triggered when one of the following conditions is met:
￿ the MS moves from the area code already stored in the SIM card, to another;
￿ the time elapsed from previous communication has exceeded a congured
interval;
￿ the MS is switched o and on in the same LA/RA: in this case, however, the
network may permit a more lightweight procedure called IMSI attach which
just mark MS' record at VLR active again. The IMSI attach, however, often
falls back to a full location update execution, so the rest of the thesis will
use both terms interchangeably.
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Despite dierences between GSM and UMTS technologies, that derive from the
fact that they use dierent radio interfaces, a high level description of the attach
procedure can be described as follows:
Channel establishment: once MS's modem have scan the air interface choosing,
and then synchronizing, with the cell that it considers the best server, the
device is ready to make its rst request to the network, reporting its location
update intentions. This operation is called a random access request and it
is always carried over a radio resource, also called channel, contended with
other devices: the network, in fact, still does not know their presence at
all, thus cannot allocate dedicated resources for them. Once RAN receives
the mobile request the CN usually allocates a signalling channel to carry on
successive messages exchange, then delegates back to the RAN the task of
making the device actually switch to the dedicated resource. Over the new
dedicated channel MS may nally place its location update request sending
its identity, usually in the form of the last used TMSI and Location Area,
but, when they are not available, the IMSI is used instead.
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA): before proceeding further in the
attach procedure CN may require MS' authentication: this is the case when,
for example, IMSI is used as identity declaration. The authentication process
begin with MSC asking HLR authentication information for a given IMSI;
HLR verify the presence of the IMSI in its database and, aided by AuC, gen-
erates a random RAND, which is processed by digest algorithm along with the
IMSI's private key Ki thus obtaining an expected response XRES and a cipher-
ing key Kc. (RAND, XRES, Kc) is the authentication triplet sent back to MSC
which, in turn, sends RAND to mobile and receives back SRES as a response:
MSC nally claims the user as authentic if and only if XRES = SRES. All the
computations on the MS side is performed by the SIM card which is the only
other element, apart from HLR, that knows both the digest algorithm and
the private key Ki.
MS validation: last product of the authentication phase is the key Kc, which is
used from now on for message ciphering between MS and MSC. Inside this
protected channel MSC may ask MS to send its IMEI in order to match it
against EIR.
(P-)TMSI assignation: being both SIM and equipment valid, the location up-
date procedure concludes assigning a new TMSI, Packet-TMSI (P-TMSI) or
both to the MS, depending on the type of attach requested. This is the
identier that will be used for successive communications with the network.
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3.2 Vulnerability in location updating
The peculiarity of location update procedure is that it cannot leverage any previ-
ously accrued knowledge as it must accommodate for new devices of which there
is no previous information. Moreover the design described in the introduction, i.e.
the model of a smart-network and of dumb terminals, requires the whole proce-
dure to be computationally light for the terminals and to delegate to the network
most of the operations and resources. Thus, the terminals do not have to com-
mit signicant resources but the network does. These two facts are the basis of
the vulnerability to DoS that is present in the attach procedure; in fact, during
the AKA step, an unauthenticated device may force the core network to carry on
computations that are more resource consuming than the request itself.
As described by Khan et al. work [18], the way an attack could be mounted
is straightforward. In a preliminary phase an attacker builds a database of valid
IMSIs in a way outlined by [18] itself: whilst there is some commercially-available
GSM/UMTS testing and analysing tools that, investing quite a lot of money, may
automatize the process, obtaining user identities may also be carried out in a
cheaper way, which takes advantage of the opportunity to request IMSI directly
from the MS. During the location update procedure, right after MS placed its
attach request with TMSI as claimed identity, core network may indeed fail to per-
form TMSI-to-IMSI translation, for example due to a VLR database malfunction:
this circumstance force the network to ask IMSI directly to MS itself. The above
mentioned protocol concession happens before any network validation could be
made on the MS side, thus allowing an attacker with either a rogue BTS/NodeB,
or impersonating the MSC, to coerce MSs into revealing their identities.
The second phase of the attack consists in 
ooding the network with attach
requests each one carrying a dierent stolen IMSI chosen from built database. The
cellular network forwards the requests to HLR/AuC where each IMSI is validated
and, being authentic, triggers the calculation of authentication information that
are sent back to either MSC or SGSN that, in turn, must submit the challenge
back to the mobile station and verify the reply correctness. As the attacker is
not controlling the SIM corresponding to the IMSI used, he doesn't know Ki, so
he can't calculate the correct answer; however, he does not need to provide it,
in fact he does not need to successfully complete the attach procedure, but, on
the contrary, his goal is to exhaust HLR/AuC computing resources thus he is
already hitting the target with all the valid attach requests he is injecting. The
second phase outlines also why a list of valid IMSI is indeed necessary: rst, using
TMSIs requires both the attack and TMSIs' harvesting to be ongoing at the same
time because this type of identiers are ephemeral both in space and time; second,
TMSIs force MSC to perform TMSI-to-IMSI resolutions that both dilate execution
times and may deplete MSC's resources, causing it to become a bottleneck that
reduces attack's eectiveness; nally, a random IMSI may fail HLR validation tests,
thus consuming only a minimal amount of resources. Although authors describe
this attack with UMTS architecture in mind, it is important to notice that it can
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be ported, with minimal changes, both to old GSM [14] and new LTE [1] networks.
3.3 Measuring HLR performances
Despite outlining the attack described above, Khan work, however, does not pro-
vide a value for the HLR/AuC performance, thus it can't estimate the number of
terminals needed by an attacker in order to considerably degrade HLR services.
A partial analysis of this problem comes from Traynor et al. article [26]. In this
work they outline an attack targeting HLR, but they adopt a dierent approach
that leverages a botnet of authenticated devices, repeatedly injecting resource-
demanding transactions available only to already attached terminals. In order to
nd the transaction that best suits their needs, the authors benchmark the av-
erage throughput |in Transactions Per Second (TPS)| of an HLR setup, with
respect to dierent transaction types. Their results are presented in gure 3.2 and
point out that the most resource demanding activities are the ones involving both
data reading and writing like insertion or deletion of call forwarding rules or the
location updating procedure. As a next step authors test on a live network the
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Figure 3.2: HLR throughput for each transaction type in a MySQL setup
containing 500k subscribers. [26]
execution time of aforementioned transactions in order to nd the best trade-o
between computational load and execution speed. They use a mobile phone com-
manded via AT interface [5]: obtained results, presented in table 3.1, lead them
to choose the insert call forwarding procedure as the attack vector. Table 3.1,
however, highlight also a peculiarity of the attach procedure which has been intro-
duced with UMTS: in order to speed up attach procedure and amortize the cost
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of device authentication SGSN may require more than one authentication triplet1
where one of them will be consumed on the 
y while the others are cached for
future use. This is the reason why the authors measure two dierent timings for
the location update both when it hits the HLR and when it just stops at the SGSN
utilizing previously calculated challenges.
Response time
Location update hitting HLR 3s
Location update resolved at SGSN 2.5s
Insert call forwarding 2.7s
Delete call forwarding 2.5s
Table 3.1: Execution times of some HLR transactions measured on a live
PLMN. [26]
Authors then simulate the eect of injecting attack trac on an HLR setup
already serving a typical mix of transactions, both in low and high legitimate trac
assumptions. Their simulation results, shown in gure 3.3, permits to determine
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Figure 3.3: Throughput degradation of legitimate trac on an HLR setup
with dierent attack rates. [26]
the rate of malicious requests that an attacker is supposed to deliver in order to
achieve a target HLR throughput degradation. Once this rate is dened, equation
3.1 gives the number of needed compromised devices:
number of device = attack trac (TPS)  request period (s) (3.1)
1In UMTS the GSM authentication triplet has been extended with two more information called
integrity key IK and authentication token AUTN which serves respectively for message integrity
calculation and network authentication by the MS. Being no more a triplet this ve information
has been also renamed into authentication vector.
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Traynor's request period equals 4.7s which is composed by 2.7s spent in executing
the insert call forwarding transaction, whether remaining 2s are a delay guard
between successive requests, required by the device. Table 3.2 oers a snapshot of
all presented results.2
MySQL setup
Low trac High trac
Target TPS degradation 93% 93%
Attack trac 2500TPS 5000TPS
Request period 4.7s 4.7s
Number of compromised devices 11750 23500
Table 3.2: HLR attack viability based on performance measurements con-
ducted by Traynor et al. [26]
Both gure 3.3 and table 3.2 outline that the more busy the HLR is, the more
dicult is disrupting its services. The explanation of this counter-intuitive result
resides in HLR equally serving both legitimate and attack requests after reaching
its capacity cap. This means that the more legitimate requests are delivered the
more their probability of being processed is high or, in other words, only a more
powerful attack may convey enough malicious requests so they are more likely to
be served instead of legitimate ones.
Traynor's performance measurements in proposed attack. From gure
3.2 it is possible to determine that the get access data procedure is roughly 5 times
faster than the insert call forwarding one, so, in order to achieve the same level of
service degradation, we assume that also needed attack trac must be multiplied
by 5. This puts our target to 12500 TPS in low-trac assumption and 25000 TPS
in high-trac one; however, for the attacker this is a worst case scenario: in fact
Traynor's tests focus only on the HLR, disregarding the computations at the AuC
that are needed to calculate authentication information.
3.4 Limits of regular mobile phones
To launch the attack Traynor needs a smartphone botnet for two reasons: rst,
clients must be authenticated before submitting an insert call forwarding request;
second, this very kind of procedure is a standard one, so it is possible for an ap-
plication to ask the underlying operating system to begin its execution. In our
scenario, instead, regular phones are a limiting factor. First, from a smartphone's
2In [26] authors present also a SolidDB HLR setup. However, simulation results regarding
this environment are not completely consistent all over the paper; this fact, coupled with an
absence of comparison between throughput performance of insert call forwarding and get access
data procedures, lead us to omit this setup in presented results.
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OS there's no way to distinguish among the steps of the GSM/UMTS authentica-
tion procedure once it has been started: OSes control the modem component via
a Radio Interface Layer3 which converts high level actions such \call number" or
\send SMS" into AT commands that the modem logic can understand [5].
Both high level actions and AT commands, however, are too abstract for our
needs because the only way to force the attach procedure would be switching
the radio o and on again. This operation is completely contained inside the
GSM/UMTS protocol stack and operatively hidden inside the baseband module
itself, thus the module informs the OS only after the completion or failure of the
entire procedure. More in details, in a mobile phone the access to the network can
take only one of these three roads:
1. if the device has a valid SIM module, then the attach procedure completes
unless there is a failure on the network side;
2. if the device has an invalid |for example expired| SIM module, then it
initiate the attach procedure, but the network rejects it without needing a
signicant amount of resources;
3. if the device has no SIM module at all, then it does not even initiate the
attach procedure.
The only way to use a standard phone for performing multiple attach procedures
is to equip it with a programmable SIM card and instruct the card to return a
dierent IMSI as well as a random challenge response at each invocation. However,
in this case too the solution is denitely sub-optimal because of the phone itself.
Built-in mobile protocol stack is implemented strictly following 3GPP specications
which, in turn, are full of transmission wait times, exponential backos, maximum
re-transmission trials and other artices [3] designed with the precise purpose to
induce a fair use of the network resources. As a proof of this fact Traynor highlights
that, during his network behaviour measurements, he was forced to insert a 2s
delay between each request: its removal, otherwise, caused extended execution
times. The very goal of a DoS attack, on the contrary, is to unfairly squander
the network resources in order to prevent legitimate devices to access the service;
furthermore we want to reach the limits of the air interface in order to cut down
the number of attacking point. For these reasons we claim that the tool best suited
to an attacker needs is a dedicated device capable of accessing the network without
needing a valid SIM, and without the timing guards and the strict adherence to
the protocol that are normally introduced in components aimed at the consumer
market.
3RIL specications are available for Windows Mobile
ﬁ http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa920475.aspx (accessed on May 2013) and Android http://www.kandroid.org/
online-pdk/guide/telephony.html (accessed on May 2013).
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3.5 Analysing the Air Interface
We now analyse the peculiarities of GSM and UMTS air interface protocols to
evaluate their limits in terms of number of attach requests sent to the base station
per second. In this process we suppose to be the only device communicating with
the target cell; this hypothesis is unrealistic, but is a direct consequence of the
unfairness of the attacking device: while legitimate mobile phones would backo
when facing a trac problem, our device actively works toward the consumption of
all the cell's resources. Thus, most of the time a mobile phone tries to get access,
it won't be served because of the high number of requests injected by the attacking
device, moreover, as soon as a legitimate request completes, the high number of
requests injected by the attacking device generates a high probability that the just
freed resources will be grabbed by the attacker and made unavailable to legitimate,
well behaved devices.
3.5.1 GSM air interface
Um protocol, that is the GSM air interface, has been designed to take advantage of
both Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA)|like previous 1G technologies|
and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA). Multiple frequencies are mainly used
to boost cell capacity in terms of concurrent calls, time division, on the other hand,
permits to multiplex multiple voice sources, services and signalling onto the same
frequency in order to achieve better spectral eciency. GSM cells are distinguished
one another by having dierent carrier frequencies that the MS swipes during its
boot-up procedures. This particular air resource, being always present, is the one
which carries fundamental information for a devices aiming to contact the PLMN
along as signalling trac: for this reason in further explanations we will always
refer to this single frequency, focusing instead on the peculiarities of TDMA.
In GSM the atomic part of the time domain is represented by the 8 Time
Slots (TSs) composing a TDMA frame. Each TSi s 577s long and carries what it
is called a burst of data. There are dierent burst types to accommodate functions
like synchronization, frequency correction, random access and, of course, data de-
livery: in this latter case the TSt ransport capacity is 114 bits. TDMA frames,
whose periodicity is 4:615ms, are grouped in multiframes which serves two dierent
purposes:
trac multiframes are composed by 26 frames, thus having a 120ms period,
and are responsible for voice trac delivery;
signalling multiframes are made up of 51 frames, thus having a 235:38ms pe-
riod, and deliver signalling and service information.
The complete frame hierarchy presented in gure 3.4 shows two more grouping
stages: the superframe acts as an align level for trac and signalling multiframes;
hyperframe's main purpose, instead, is related to communication ciphering. Both
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this grouping, however, has been cited only for completeness as they won't be cited
any further.
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Figure 3.4: Hierarcy of frames in GSM. [14]
The TDMA/FDMA texture lead to the concept of physical channel described
by a frequency/time slot couple: this means that a single-frequency cell makes only
8 physical channels available. Physical channels are the actual carrier over which
dierent types of data, called logical channels, are laid in a time-multiplexed way.
For example TS0 of the cell's carrier frequency cyclically transmit signatures for
MS synchronization, cell's information, paging signals, etc. spread over an entire
signalling multiframe in a precongured way. Actually mobile standard dictates
the available congurations for signalling multiframes as they mostly vary for the
number of available logical channels destined to MS{core network signalling. This
particular resource, called SDCCH, is familiar to network planner because it is
needed SMSs along as location update or call set-up signalling; being this a critic
task the standard allow to compose dierent multiframe congurations in order to
grow or shrink the number of SDCCHs available, thus accommodating dierent
trac demands. The conguration that we refer to in this thesis is reported in
gure 3.5; it commits two entire timeslots for signalling purposes, but also exposes
a total amount of 12 SDCCHs, which means that at most 12 MS may use this
channel at the same time. [14, 26]
Figure 3.5 shows also that some logical channels occupy 4 successive frames.
The reason for this behaviour is that most of the GSM signalling messages are
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link network segment.
FN FN TS 0 TS 0 TS 1 TS 1
0
SDCCH 3 SACCH 1
1
2
3
4 RACH
SACCH 2
5 RACH
6
SACCH 0
7
8
SACCH 3
9
10
SACCH 1
11
12 IDLE
13 IDLE
14 RACH IDLE
15 RACH
SDCCH 0
16 RACH
17 RACH
18 RACH
19 RACH
SDCCH 1
20 RACH
21 RACH
22 RACH
23 RACH
SDCCH 2
24 RACH
25 RACH
26 RACH
27 RACH
SDCCH 3
28 RACH
29 RACH
30 RACH
31 RACH
SDCCH 4
32 RACH
33 RACH
34 RACH
35 RACH
SDCCH 5
36 RACH
37
SDCCH 0
38
39
SDCCH 6
40
41
SDCCH 1
42
43
SDCCH 7
44
45 RACH
46 RACH
47
SDCCH 2 SACCH 0
48
49
50
(b) Multiframe conguration in the uplink
network segment.
Figure 3.5: Reference multiframe conguration for the 12 SDCCH instance;
missing timeslots are entirely dedicated to voice trac.
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carried over LAPDm frames with a static size of 23 bytes; in their way to the air
interface this frames are rst processed by channel coding algorithms and then
spread by interleaver which produced 4 burst suitable to be transmitted by the
same number of time slots. Each logical channel, however, is bound to a single
physical one, so this 4 bursts shall be transmitted in the same time slot number
but in consecutive frames, obtaining this way the occupation pattern depicted in
the gure.
GSM attack limits
GSM attach procedure involves only three channels as depicted in gure 3.6:
RACH, AGCH and SDCCH. To evaluate the design limits of the GSM proto-
col we state that it is enough to characterized each logical channel involved both
in its multiplicity constraints and utilization time, in order to nd out which one
introduces the maximum bottleneck. This assumption is backed by the expectation
that core network does not pose signicant signalling bottlenecks with respect to
the air interface of a single cell, moreover, in GSM protocol there is no resources,
other than available channels, that may limit the number of user concurrently
communicating with the BTS.
Random Access Channel (RACH) analysis
The RACH|the Random Access Channel| is the uplink channel used to carry
mobile phone's access requests; in normal conditions, it is governed by the slotted
ALOHA protocol, so, in order to maximize its performances, protocol developer
designed RACH messages to ll just a single timeslot. We specied \normal condi-
tions" because, in our scenario, we don't care about contention that may be caused
by other devices, thus, dierently from the normal scenario, we do not apply any
backo and we aim directly at the full channel consumption. In such a scenario,
the 12 SDCCHs conguration provides 27 RACH access slots each multiframe and
this means a capacity of:
RACH =
27
235:38ms
 114:7 TPS (3.2)
This result is not fully consistent with the 80TPS calculated by [26] for the slotted
ALOHA instance: authors assume a multiframe entirely dedicated to RACH slots,
but this is not the case when 12 SDCCHs are deployed, as conrmed by gure 3.5.
Access Grant Channel (AGCH) analysis
The AGCH downlink channel is used to answer incoming random access request; it
carries the information needed by the mobile phone to access the dedicated channel
used for further communications. Reference conguration allows the BSC to answer
up to 3 RACH requests every multiframe by means of the immediate assignment
commands. The BSC, however, may use also the extended version of this command
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MS BTS
SDCCH/I/MM
AUTH_RSP [SRES]
RACH/RR
CHAN_REQ [reason, refer.]
AGCH/RR
IMM_ASS_CMD [channel, refer.,  ]
SDCCH/SABM/MM
LOC_UPD_REQ [IMSI, ...]
SDCCH/I/RR CIPH_MOD_CMD [A5/X]
SDCCH/I/MM TMSI_REAL_COM [-/-]
SDCCH/I/MM IDENT_RSP [IMEI, ...]
SDCCH/I/MM IDENT_REQ [IMEI,  ]
SDCCH/I/RR CIPH_MOD_COM [-/-]
SDCCH/I/MM TMSI_REAL_CMD [TMSI]
SDCCH/I/MM LOC_UPD_ACC [e.g. TMSI]
SDCCH/I/RR CHAN_REL [reason]
SDCCH/DISC (LAPDm)
SDCCH/UA (LAPDm)
SDCCH/UA/MM
LOC_UPD_REQ [IMSI,  ]
SDCCH/I/MM
AUTH_REQ [CKSN, RAND]
Authentication and 
key agreement
Dedicated channel 
acquisition
Figure 3.6: Messages exchanged between MS and BTS during the GSM
attach procedure. [14] The lighting on the left marks the message replaced
during the attack.
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which allows channel assignment to two mobile phones simultaneously, hence dou-
bling AGCH capacity: we will see, however, that even in the non-extended, and
therefore more stringent, case the AGCH is not the attack bottleneck. Back to
AGCH characterization, it leads to an attack capacity of
AGCH =
3
235:38ms
 12:7 TPS (3.3)
which indeed represent a tighter limit than RACH.
Standalone Dedicated Control Channel (SDCCH) analysis
The main part of the attach procedure is delivered via SDCCH that is an bidi-
rectional channel assigned to a mobile terminal and reserved to it until a special
channel release message is issued by the BSC. As we stated above, in our sce-
nario we assume the presence of 12 SDCCHs; determining their occupation time,
however, is quite tricky.
Traynor et al. [26] measured an average time of 3s to perform a complete at-
tach where 0.5s are needed by the core network to contact HLR/AuC, calculate the
authentication information and receive data back. We prove that the remaining
2.5s are spent to send messages back and forth between the mobile phone and the
BTS. A multiframe can carry just one message for each SDCCH in each direction,
but, when the BTS requires information to the mobile phone, the latter one can
answer in the same multiframe: in fact the GSM protocol states a displacement
between downlink and uplink multiframes that allows the MS to compute its reply.
Given these two rules and assuming two multiframes needed for the RACH-AGCH
exchange, we may conclude that completing the attach procedure requires 11 mul-
tiframes, that is 11  235:38ms = 2:6s that is almost exactly the time obtained
in Traynor's measurements. Thus we say that, during message exchange between
the MS and the BTS, the only wait time is related to the HLR/AuC interrogation;
this, in turn, allows us to estimate SDCCH utilization time during our attack.
The attach procedure's message exchange will be modied during the attack just
from authentication response message on, in the way depicted in gure 3.7. After
receiving the authentication request the device answers back with a LAPDm DISC
message that request BTS to terminate the multiple frame operation, releasing its
Layer 2 connection [6]. We use this procedure instead of replying with a wrong SRES
for two reasons: rst, it speeds up the SDCCH release cutting the number of needed
messages from 10 to 7; second, the authentication request message, containing the
challenge, already carries the proof that the HLR/AuC has been consulted. Using
the same rule, we now require 6 multiframes, 4 of which are carried over SDCCH,
leading to a channel holding time of 4235:38ms+0:5s = 1:44s, thus a 12 SDCCHs
capacity of:
SDCCHs =
12
1:44s
 8:3 TPS (3.4)
Comparing each channel capacity and choosing the lower one, we argue that
GSM attacking capabilities are limited by the SDCCH channel at a rate of 8 TPS.
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MS
RACH/RR
CHAN_REQ [reason, refer.]
AGCH/RR
IMM_ASS_CMD [channel, refer.,  ]
SDCCH/SABM/MM
LOC_UPD_REQ [IMSI, ...]
SDCCH/UA/MM
LOC_UPD_REQ [IMSI,  ]
SDCCH/I/MM
AUTH_REQ [CKSN, RAND]
SDCCH/DISC (LAPDm)
SDCCH/UA (LAPDm)
BTS
Figure 3.7: Messages exchanged between MS and BTS during the attack:
our device solicits an early disconnection right after receiving the AUTH REQ
from the network.
This result tells us that in the low legitimate-trac assumption a GSM-only attack
can be mounted with 1563 SIMless devices spread over the same number of cells.
This count is already an order of magnitude lower than Traynor's one, but, the
multiple RAN architecture makes possible to reduce it even more: for this reason
we will now focus on UMTS location update procedure, conducting an air interface
analysis aimed at nding the limits to its attacking eciency.
3.5.2 UMTS air interface
UMTS is a mobile cellular system designed to remove GSM ineciencies related to
synchronization between all devices in the RAN. For this reason it substitutes the
TDMA protocol with a particular form of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA),
that is Wideband CDMA (W-CDMA), that allows Node B to transmit simultane-
ously to multiple mobile phones on the same carrier frequency as long as dierent
channelization codes are used.
This codes |also known as Walsh{Hadamard sequences| are multiplied with
the bit sequence coming out from the channel coding block: the resulting sequence
has an higher rate than the input one and UMTS specication xes it at 3:84Mcps
|where the \c" stands for chip. Due to the dierences in data rates between
services, and because the output speed is xed, the system should be able to apply
variant scaling factors. This requisite is feasible because Walsh{Hadamard codes
may have dierent lengths that, once applied to the same initial sequence as in
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gure 3.8, results in an output rate directly proportional to the code length: this
fact leads to the concept of Spreading Factor (SF) which is dened as the number
of chips sent for each bit of information.
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Figure 3.8: Dierent spreading outcomes obtained by multiplying the
source signal with Walsh-Hadamard sequences having spreading factor 4
and 8 respectively.
However, the most important property belonging to Walsh{Hadamard codes
is orthogonality that means that two dierent sequences of the same length may
be multiplied together chip-by-chip and then add up the results leading to a total
always equals to zero. In order to obtain orthogonal codes with dierent lengths
the method used is the \binary tree-rule" depicted in gure 3.9 and described by
the following recursive equation:
H(2
k) =
8
<
:
[1] if k = 0 
H(2k 1) H(2k 1)
H(2k 1)  H(2k 1)

if k > 0
(3.5)
where H(2k) is a square matrix whose rows are the Walsh{Hadamard codes of
length 2k. This formulation strictly limits the number of available sequences, in
fact the number of codes of a certain length equals the length itself; moreover,
UMTS documentation bounds code lengths in the range 4{512 further reducing
the choice. However not all codes depicted in the gure are mutually orthogonal,
orthogonality is indeed respected while choosing among the same-length set, but
sequences with a dierent spreading factor, i.e. dierent length, are orthogonal so
long as they are not ancestors or descendants of each other.
Channelization codes are used in dierent ways on the uplink and downlink
segment of the network: on the downlink portion their purpose is discriminating
among dierent channels which, in turn, may be dedicated to single users; on the
uplink segment, instead, orthogonal codes distinguish between multiple connec-
tions coming from the same mobile device. This latter point leaves open question:
how the Node B may recognise a mobile station from the others? This task is
accomplished by scrambling codes which also serves to distinguish dierent Node
B signals: all UMTS' Node Bs actually transmit on the same frequency range so,
this is the mean by which MSs can selectively listen to them. Scrambling codes
are multiplied with the signal after spreading codes but, being 38400 chips long
with a repetition of 10ms, this time resulting rate is not changed. Their generation
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Figure 3.9: Portion of the spreading codes tree: UMTS uses lengths in the
range 4{512.
process uses a pseudo-random number generator which makes this codes uncorre-
lated. This characteristic is looser than orthogonality, it results in a much higher
number of available codes |about four million| but also cause a certain amount
of interference between signals because the multiplication of two scrambling codes
bit-by-bit and then summing up obtained results gives a total that is zero only on
the average: this obviously leads to an higher and higher chance of receiver errors
as new devices joins the network.
UMTS attack limits
The complete UMTS location update procedure is very similar in its phases to the
one already presented for GSM (Fig. 3.6), for this reason here we focus only the
message exchanges between MS and Node B during the attack, illustrated in gure
3.10.
The rst message that deviates from a standard location update 
ow is the
same as in GSM, that is, the authentication response message. Unlike GSM,
however, this time the attacker has to reply to the authentication request with a
wrong challenge response SRES because, at this stage, the UMTS protocol stack
does not allow a MS-initiated connection release: neither at RRC layer [2], nor at
RLC one [4]. The attack vector of gure 3.10 is exactly the same described by
Khan et al. [18] and it is the one that uses as few Node B/SGSN resources as
possible in order to not make the processing power of this devices an unintentional
bottleneck. This solicitude is right in the opposite direction of the attack proposed
by Kambourakis et al. [17] that aims to overstress both HLR and SGSN: authors
modify the MS capabilities declared in the initial GPRS attach message; doing so
the location update procedure execute 
awlessly until the security mode command
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MS Node B
RACH/RRC
Connection Request [reason, refer.]
FACH/RRC
Connection Setup [RNTI, state, SRBs]
DCH/RRC
Connection Setup Complete
DCH/RCC/GMM
Attach Request [IMSI, attach type]
DCH/RRC/GMM
Authentication Request [RAND, AUTN]
DCH/RCC/GMM
Authentication Response [SRES]
DCH/RRC/GMM
Authentication Reject
DCH/RRC
Connection Release
DCH/RRC
Connection Release Complete
Authentication and 
key agreement
Dedicated channel 
acquisition
Figure 3.10: Messages exchanged between MS and Node B during the
attack. The lighting on the left marks the message carrying the wrong
SRES response.
323.5. ANALYSING THE AIR INTERFACE
is issued, that is, when the MS checks the security capabilities early received by
the network and, noting the inconsistency, terminates the procedure. We argue,
however, that trying to obtain also an SGSN DoS requires a much more careful
attack design because, otherwise, this device may easily become an obstruction for
request targeted at the more capable HLR.4
Before continuing to an in-depth analysis of the air interface we should estimate
how long dedicated resources are kept occupied by a single request. To this end
Johnson et al. [16] prole the delay time of an UMTS data connection setup, that
is, the elapsed time from initial rrcConnectionRequest, after radio powers up, to
the rst UDP packet sent. Before sending an UDP packet the MS should establish
a Packet Data Protocol (PDP) context which, in turn, requires the device to be
located and authenticated, that is, MS should perform a complete location update
run: here's why the article proved to be valuable. Authors' analysis covers both
a Signalling Radio Bearer (SRB) capability of 3:7kbps and 14:8kbps. An UMTS
Radio Bearer is a data streams that spans multiple network elements with a dened
Quality of Service (QoS), bitrate, acknowledgement mode and other parameters
dened both by documentations and network planners. Radio Bearers allocated
for signalling are typically declined with the two bitrates stated above: the 3:7kbps
is the most common of the two because it uses less resources, but, when signalling
trac gets higher, the switch to the more capable and more resource-expensive
14:8kbps SRB may be necessary.
Table 3.3 shows that the MS receives the security mode command at 1160ms
and 850ms respectively: this message is what a mobile usually receives after it pass
the authentication phase. In our scenario it will be replaced by the authentication
reject dispatch, followed 10m later by the rrcConnectionRelease: this 10ms delay
is due to the Transmission Time Interval (TTI) of the UMTS signalling frame
and supposes a channel without jitters.5 Lastly, 10ms after the request of connec-
tion release, MS replies with a rrcConnectionReleaseComplete roughly at 1180ms
for the 3:7kbps case and 870ms for the other. This values, however, does not
include HLR/AuC interrogation overhead that authors estimate of about 600ms,
thus resulting in a total procedure time of 1780ms and 1470ms for the 3:7kbps and
14:8kbps respectively. We want to notice that these timing may be overestimated
in our scenario, because the security mode command force network elements to
activate ciphering and integrity protections routines: this overhead is obviously
not present when the authentication request is rejected.
The high-level description of UMTS already dened two of the three constraints
that limit the number of users a Node B may concurrently service: channelization
4[17] proposes also to couple its attack with a database of stolen IMSI in order to cause a
much more serious damage: this is however impossible because the attacker, without knowing Ki,
would not pass the authentication phase and hence, would not reach the security mode command
needed to trigger the additional resource depletion.
5Obviously this assumption does not hold in real world examples, but, being the attacker able
to place the devices wherever he wants, we may assume that dierences in inter-arrival times can
be limited enough to be ignored or amortized by other approximations.
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Table 3.3: UMTS location update setup dalays, as registered by a MS. [16]
3:7kbps SRB 14:8kbps SRB
RRC Connection Request 0ms 0ms
RRC Connection Setup 390ms 400ms
RRC Connection Setup Complete 590ms 590ms
GPRS Attach Request 590ms 600ms
Security Mode Command 1160ms 850ms
Security Mode Complete 1160ms 860ms
GPRS Attach Accept 1560ms 1040ms
codes and interference; the third one that remains to be mentioned is network
access. We will now proceed in the analysis of all this aspects to identify the most
stringent one in terms of attacking capacity.
Random Access analysis
The rst UMTS bottleneck we are going to estimate is random access. Before
accessing RACH the MS has to send out some short preambles, with increas-
ing power, until Node B acknowledge their reception over Acquisition Indicator
Channel (AICH): the procedure is dened this way in order to select the minimum
power needed to reach the Node B itself. Preambles consists of 256 repetitions of a
16 chips long Hadamard sequence so, there are 16 sequences the mobile may ran-
domly choose from. Once the output power has been calibrated the mobile phone
may transmit its single transport block message over RACH, which usually takes a
20ms transmission time interval. Sticking with the single-device hypothesis already
used for GSM, and stating that, given the attacking device stationary, it takes just
one preamble to demand Node B attention, we estimate a total RACH utilization
time of 30ms. This sentence, however, involves also the assumption that the rrc-
ConnectionSetupComplete message is not sent over RACH: we state that this is
the case because MS early declares its attach intentions in the rrcConncectionRe-
quest, so the network prefers to redirect the high amount of successive signalling
trac over a Dedicate Channel (DCH), instead of polluting the shared one. This
basis, coupled with AICH capability to acknowledge up to 16 preamble signature
at the same time, lead to a random access capacity of:
PRACH =
16
30ms
 533 TPS (3.6)
Forward Access Channel (FACH) analysis
Once the network received the rrcConnectionRequest it assigns dedicated resources
via rrcConnectionSetup message sent over FACH, a shared downlink channel. This
message is relatively large as it typically requires seven transport block of 168 bit
each, transmitted, multiplexed in couples, using 10ms TTI [16]. This led to a total
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capacity of FACH channel of:
FACH =
1
7=2  10ms
 28:5 TPS (3.7)
which is also consistent with FACH throughput of 32{33kbps commonly used in
literature.
Downlink network segment analysis
When RRC-layer connection has been established further message exchanges are
carried on a per-user dedicated channel. This means that on the downlink segment
the number of simultaneous user is limited only by cell transmitting power and the
number of available channelization codes. Transmitting power, however, does not
pose major hurdles giving that the attacking device will be placed near the antenna
and never moves. On the other hand we already see that channelization codes are
a scarce resource but, in order to estimate the number of available ones, we have
to conjecture about the spreading factor used by dedicated channels. Given that
uplink throughput is usually lower than downlink one, we use user-layer uplink
DCH data rates calculated in [15] to identify sucient SFs; dedicated channels,
however, have to share available codes also with common channels and this repre-
sents an overhead of about 10 codes with SF = 128. [15] We are now able to derive
downlink channel capacity using the timing assumptions already described above:
while given values are comprehensive of the access phase over RACH/FACH, we
need to keep it included because when MS receives the rrcConnectionSetup mes-
sage its dedicated channel has been already reserved. Results taking into account
all these factors are presented in table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Downlink attacking capacity calculations.
3:7kbps SRB 14:8kbps SRB
Spreading Factor 256 128
Available dedicated channels 236 118
Channel occupation time (s) 1:78 1:47
DLchannels (TPS) 132.6 80.3
Uplink network segment analysis
The uplink segment uses scrambling codes to distinguish between transmissions
coming from dierent MS. This codes, however, causes interference with each other,
thus it is not possible to arbitrarily add new mobile stations to the system, trying to
exhaust all available scrambling codes: for this reason CDMA networks are referred
to as being interference-limited systems. The estimation of the number of device
that may concurrently access the air interface is subordinated to two concepts: pole
capacity and Rise Over Thermal (ROT). Pole capacity is the theoretical maximum
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capacity of the system due to interference. Under the hypothesis of perfect power
control, where all devices are received with the same power, and quasi-orthogonal
codes, that scrambling codes approximates, pole capacity can be written as:
Pole Capacity =
W
Rb


Eb
N0
 1
(3.8)
where W is the chip rate xed, in W-CDMA, to 3:84Mcps, Rb is the user data bit
rate and Eb=N0 strictly speaking, is the energy per bit to noise power spectral den-
sity ratio: in order to estimate its value, it has to be taken into account transmission
characteristics like receiver sensitivity, channel description, modulation and chan-
nel coding types etc. For our calculations we considered an Eb=N0 = 6dB which is
1:5dB higher than the state of the art estimation for a voice uplink \pedestrian"
channel presented in [15].
Pole capacity, however, is just a theoretical limit because the uplink noise rise
as (1 ) 1, with  giving the cell load factor; this means that when  approaches
1 also power needed to keep the same Eb=N0 at receiver moves toward innity. [22]
This phenomenon is called Rise Over Thermal and force the system to work away
from its analytical limit: typical congurations account for a maximum load factor
of  = 75%. [15] Composing presented constraints we are able to measure capacity
on the uplink channel which numerical results are presented in table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Uplink attacking capacity calculations.
3:7kbps SRB 14:8kbps SRB
Eb=N0 6dB 6dB
Pole capacity 260 65
 75% 75%
ROT capacity 195 48
Channel occupation time (s) 1:78 1:47
ULchannels (TPS) 109:6 32:7
During uplink capacity calculations we have to pay attention that ROT capac-
ity does not exceed the number of available downlink dedicated channels, indeed,
the comparison between tables 3.4 and 3.5 conrms found results. Another inter-
esting side note to uplink and downlink calculations concerns the higher attacking
capacity of the 3:7kbps SRB with respect to the 14:8kbps one. The 3:7kbps SRB
is indeed slower in performing location update signalling than the other but tables
3.4 and 3.5 show that the latter has lower \attacking eciency" because it requires
a lot of resources that do not match with the modest procedure speed-up.
The comparison of bottlenecks found so far shows that the hard limit of UMTS
attacking capacity is given by the FACH channel at a rate of roughly 28 TPS. The
fact that this limit is given by a channel used just to carry a single message, instead
of dedicated ones, may be explained by the fact that UMTS system's design has
privileged throughput maximization for high-load, long-standing connections: for
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this reason a connection setup requiring a bit more resources than in GSM is well
amortized in following exchanges. Our attack requests, on the other hand, are fast
and bandwidth-limited, that is, right in the opposite direction from typical UMTS
transaction and, as a direct consequence, they clash with the increased connection
setup complexity.
The attack rate found above, however, is not the absolute limit achievable via
attach procedure, but, in order to push it to full capacity, each device has to know
the IMSI' secret keys Ki that is, we have to remove the SIM-less constraint.
Doubling UMTS attacking capacity using SIMs
Given the peculiar limitation discovered so far, we deeper investigated UMTS spec-
ication that covers the attach procedure [2], looking for any stratagem that would
force the core network to query the HLR more than once before tearing down the
ongoing signalling connection. Luckily enough the protocol allows this kind of
trick. With respect to GSM, UMTS security has been improved under many as-
pects and some of them, for example network authenticity check, even represent
new entries over previous generation. Testing the authenticity of the network al-
lows a MS to disclose an attacker trying to impersonate the network itself with,
for example, a rogue Node B. The key information needed in the process is the
AUTN value sent with the authentication request message and obtained as described
in gure 3.11. This generation employs a random value RAND which state output
freshness, the Authentication and Key Management Field AMF that contains some
informations regarding MS's network validation tolerance and key lifetime and,
especially, IMSI's secret key Ki and a particular sequence value SQN which is incre-
mented after each successful authentication: these last two information are kept
strictly secret by MNOs thus only a legitimate network that knows both of them
could create a valid AUTN.
RAND
AMF
SQN
Ki
f5 f1
MAC AK
AUTN = SQN  AK ￿ AMF ￿ MAC
Figure 3.11: Information involved in calculating AUTN value.
The MS may incur in dierent failures during the AUTN check; one of them
regards the SQN value being out of the correct range, which in turn lead MS to
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inform the network about detected problem with an authentication failure mes-
sage, reporting synchronization failure as justication. Upon receiving this error
message, the SGSN should perform the re-synchronization procedure:
1. delete all unused authentication vectors for the faulty IMSI;
2. obtain new vectors from the HLR, based on information attached to authen-
tication failure message;
3. initiate a new authentication procedure sending the MS an authentication
request with one of the freshly obtained authentication vectors.
This process, however, may be executed just once because 3GPP documentation
[2] explicitly states that the network may terminate the authentication procedure
if two consecutive authentication failure messages are received.
The way an attacker may take advantage of this protocol allowance is straight-
forward as reported by message exchanges in gure 3.12. Despite the attack sim-
plicity the gure specify that the authentication failure message carries with the
justication also the AUTS value. AUTS contains information used by the network
to prepare the fresh set of authentication vectors but, the critical point for the
attacker is that it cannot be spoofed, thus requiring valid SIM cards. Picture 3.13
explains how AUTS is calculated and shows that, as long as requisites of functions
f1, f1, f5 and f5 holds, it is robust against following threats:
replay attack: the RAND value is the same used by the network to compute AUTN
so it states the freshness of received AUTS;
eavesdropping: the value contained by AUTS |that is MS' SQNMS| is concealed
using both Ki and RAND;
tampering: AUTS is authenticated using IMSI's private key.
The attack capabilities of this modied version of the location update proce-
dure can be derived quite easily from previous calculations. Leaving aside random
access, which does not pose any limitation even in the standard attack way, we
state that current FACH capacity doubles the old one. The reason is that for each
RRC connection set up, now the attacker is able to query the HLR twice, hence
resulting in this channel carrying up to

0
FACH =
2
7=2  10ms
 57:1 TPS (3.9)
Before declaring this result as conclusive we should check that timing extension due
to the second HLR interrogation does not cause downlink and uplink segments to
become the new bottlenecks. Comparing two message exchanges of gure 3.10 and
3.12 we note that, with respect to the standard attack, the \synch failure" one just
requires another full authentication phase plus the authentication failure message:
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MS Node B
RACH/RRC
Connection Request [reason, refer.]
FACH/RRC
Connection Setup [RNTI, state, SRBs]
DCH/RRC
Connection Setup Complete
DCH/RCC/GMM
Attach Request [IMSI, attach type]
DCH/RRC/GMM
Auth Request [RAND1, AUTN1]
DCH/RCC/GMM
Auth Response [SRES]
DCH/RRC/GMM
Auth Reject
DCH/RRC
Connection Release
DCH/RRC
Connection Release Complete
DCH/RCC/GMM
Auth Failure [AUTS, «synchFail»]
DCH/RRC/GMM
Auth Request [RAND2, AUTN2] Authentication and 
key agreement
Dedicated channel 
acquisition
Figure 3.12: Messages exchanged between MS and Node B during an attach
attack that uses the synchronization failure strategy.
RAND
AMF
SQNMS
Ki
f5* f1*
MAC-S AK
AUTS = SQNMS  AK ￿ MAC-S
Figure 3.13: Information involved in calculating AUTS value.
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we already see that the former takes about 600ms; for the latter we estimate an
execution time of about 100ms which represents a conservative average of message
delivery timings proled by Johnson et al. [16] This assumptions lead to a total
execution time for the \synch failure" attack of 2:48s6 then, focusing on the uplink
network segment, which we proved to be the most constrained, its capacity become

0
ULchannels = 2 
195
2:48s
 157:2 TPS (3.10)
that still represents an improvement over the 109 TPS of standard attack. Indeed
this is an expected result because, while the number of HLR interrogation has
doubled, the resource occupation time only increased by nearly 40%, therefore
resulting in higher eciency also for dedicated channels.
This UMTS analysis shows that an attacker targeting the location update pro-
cedure of the UMTS protocol may inject up to 28 TPS to the HLR, thus being
able to cause major service degradations with as few as 446 SIMless devices in the
low legitimate trac assumption and 892 devices in the high legitimate trac one.
However, in order to grasp the full potential of the location update procedure the
attacker may permit SIMs use, therefore doubling the number of requests sent each
second, which results in only half devices needed with respect to the SIMless case.
3.6 Composing GSM and UMTS attacks
We have proved that causing major service deterioration using SIMless devices is
not only possible but, compared with the number of devices required for a botnet
based attack, allows reducing the amount of resources by more than an order of
magnitude. This result is achieved exploiting a single radio technology at a time
but our attacking device can be designed to deal with both GSM and UMTS at
the same time, therefore being able to compose their attack capacities. We can't
concretely prove these claims because said device has not been built yet, but we
now show why current technology allows us to claim that it is possible to compose
GSM and UMTS capacities in the way that is most protable from the attacker
point of view, i.e. the two technologies capabilities may be simply summed up.
3.6.1 Physical device feasibility
For what concerns technology GSM and UMTS over the air interface use dier-
ent frequency bands and this means that the device should be equipped with two
analog radio frequency modules, and a couple of baseband processors with enough
processing power to be able to keep track of all concurrent communications. Mul-
tiple analog modules are a standard equipment of every modern mobile phone
destined to the medium or high-end market: it simply processes signals without
6We refer to the 3:7kbps SRB case only, because we already pointed out how the 14:8kbps
SRB proved to be less ecient.
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knowledge of what it is carrying and it's already available on the market. Baseband
processor, instead, is a critical part because it has to deal with as many dierent
bit stream as the number of ongoing HLR requests. The proof of its feasibility is
the very presence of Node Bs and BTSs that are able to handle all the trac but,
we speculate that this is an upper bound in complexity and that the actual device
requires a signicantly simpler design as it does not need to process all the possible
events in the complete protocol or high bandwidth demands.
The sketch in gure 3.14 is a prototype of the attacking device, that employs
one baseband processor for each concurrent request which, in turn, is connected to
a multiplexer/demultiplexer (mux/demux) that compose all incoming bit streams
to produce a single output signal to be sent to the analog module. This is surely
an inecient design, because low bandwidth requirements of signalling channels
do not allow an ecient exploitation of the whole processing power, however it
represents a reference in what follows.
RF 
Module
MUX / 
DEMUX
(CDMA)
UMTS
Baseband Modules
RF 
Module
MUX / 
DEMUX
(TDMA)
GSM
Baseband Modules
Figure 3.14: A prototypical sketch of the attacking device's functional
parts.
For both systems only a small circumscribed part of the protocol should be im-
plemented and some functions, like the composition of physical channels, should be
moved from the baseband module into the MUX/DEMUX component. Moreover
there is no need to waste processing power on auxiliary functions like handover
because, being the device static, neighbouring cells received power can be com-
puted once and returned whenever asked. In GSM system the device is tuned on
the carrier frequency and requires just a time (de)multiplexer to perform correct
(de-)channelization. Transmissions and receptions, however, happen only on TS0
and TS1 of every frame: this is indeed twice the load a mobile phone is subjected
to during a call, but, being the raw processing power more than doubled from rst
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GSM-phone introduction, it should not pose any problem. Moreover transmitting
in two timeslots means that the temporal disjunction between talking and listening
periods is no longer valid: this problem can be addressed with a duplexer. UMTS
system, on the other hand, presents the main challenges for what concerns process-
ing power because all devices may talk simultaneously and also the (de)multiplexer
part is no more on the time domain, but has to account for all possible scrambling
and orthogonal codes uses by each channel of each connection.
3.6.2 Network load separation
The transactions carried over GSM and UMTS hit BTSs and Node Bs respectively
that are usually dierent pieces of hardware with their own processing power.
Moreover we already described that the location update procedure may be asked
for the circuit and packet switched domains separately, that is an attacker can force
BSCs and RNCs to deliver packets either to MSC or SGSN in a mutually exclusive
way. Using these two considerations along with an adequate dispersion of attacking
devices we suppose that the attacker is able to avoid network bottlenecks balancing
the load on dierent equipments. Certainly this is just a rst level description of
the network separation problem, however, a thoroughly one would require accurate
modelling and analysis of all the backhaul protocols and such a task is outside the
scope of this thesis..
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Figure 3.15: Using packet or circuit switched location updates on GSM or
UMTS systems it is possible to aect dierent core network elements thus
balancing trac 
ows.
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3.6.3 Summing capacities
The descriptions provided in the previous sections show that it is possible to com-
pose the attacking capabilities of each RAN in a purely additive way, thus each
device capable of exploiting dierent RANs delivers a signicantly increased at-
tacking capability. Results found so far, and summarized in table 3.6, show that
with 347 SIM-less devices or as low as 192 SIM-equipped ones, it's possible to
inject up to 12500 location update requests each second, aimed at depleting HLR
computing resources.
SIM-less device SIM-equipped device
GSM attack rate 8 TPS 8 TPS
UMTS attack rate 28 TPS 57 TPS
Total attack rate 36 TPS 65 TPS
Low trac High Trac Low trac High Trac
Target attack rate 12500 25000 12500 25000
Needed devices 347 694 192 384
Table 3.6: Summary of the attack rates deliverable via the attach proce-
dure.
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Conclusions
Cellular networks are one of the infrastructure designated as critical both in the
American and the European vision of the homeland security. This has lead to
a large number of studies that have analysed the architecture of the networks to
identify and possibly mend vulnerabilities that could be exploited to mount attacks.
Each infrastructure has been deeply analysed and many possible sweet spots for
an attack have been neutralized; however, two new factors aggravate the complexity
in the infrastructure defence. The rst of these factors is the appearance of pro-
grammable mobile phones; the second aggravating factor is, as it has been already
pinpointed in previous works [7], the interplay between dierent well known com-
ponents: in this case coexisting dierent generations of networks. In past works
several ways to mount DoS attack, leveraging the programmability of modern
smartphones, have been described, however, these works characterize methodolo-
gies that needed hijacking more than 10.000 smartphones with valid SIM modules
in order to mount a successful attack.
In this thesis we have described a dierent approach, we have evaluated the
possibility to bypass the strict timings enforced by the cellular network protocols
by means of a dedicated radio device. This allowed us to prove that it is pos-
sible to inject into the cellular networks signalling trac at an higher rate than
with a standard mobile phone. Given this fact we studied whether unauthenti-
cated devices, that is, devices not controlling valid SIM modules, may reach the
same service degradation as a botnet of regular phones: the trade o resides in
the fact that while an authenticated mobile station can query the network with
high resource-demanding operations, our attacking devices is indeed able to reach
higher request rates but, unfortunately, of activities that require less resources on
the network side. In this work we have shown that the network carries on expensive
calculations, even for unknown device, before actually asking the requesting equip-
ment to commit its own resources. For this reason it is possible to force the radio
access interface to inject through the network of a single generation (e.g. 2G, the
GSM network) several solicitations, sucient to produce a signicant degradation
of the service: this result requires about 1500 dedicated devices that is a reduc-
tion of an order of magnitude with respect to the resources employed by attacks
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described in previous works. In an eort to lower the number of needed devices,
we have studied the possibility to hit a single infrastructure core component, the
HLR, through dierent generations of network, thus leveraging the interplay be-
tween network generations in the core infrastructure. Our combination of these
two factors, using a SIMless dedicated radio device and combining the signalling
bandwidth of GSM with the one made available by the 3G (UMTS), allowed us to

ood the network with enough requests to clog HLR computing capabilities and
also reduce the number of attacking devices from more than 10.000 to barely 400:
a reduction in the amount of resources needed for a successful attack that is two
order of magnitude lower than the one required in reference literature. Further-
more, our work showed that it is possible to remove even the constraint requiring
each attacking device to own a legitimate SIM card. Finally, the device described
in this thesis causes a DoS for the signaling capabilities of the cell where it delivers
the attack: this last achievement is more eective than using a jammer and uses
less devices |that is, one| in respect to previous works.
It is also important to notice that the devices enrolled in a botnet are still
positioned by their rightful owners, independently from the attacker will. Thus,
it is possible that an unusual clustering of users (e.g. an event in a theatre or a
concert) could produce a concentration of devices that saturates the cell signalling
bandwidth and prevents some of the botnets node to full their full attacking
potential. On the contrary, the device we envision is not owned by an unknowing
user, it can be precisely placed by the attacker and even remotely triggered to start
the attack. All of these factors represents a signicant increase in the dangerousness
of the proposed attack when compared with the ones described in previous works.
Finally we want to point out that this thesis trusted exclusively upon mea-
surements and simulations already available in the literature, and, additionally
we further elaborated found data to extract some estimations based on theoret-
ical assumptions, although described by standard documentation. Unfortunately
there has been no measurement campaign in the wild because, in the rst instance,
there were no hardware, readily available, that could be used to precisely execute
the protocol steps we presented. For this reason the discard of regular phone was
beyond doubt because either their protocol implementation is both closed-source
and not modiable or the open source alternatives are limited to the GSM proto-
col stack.1 Moreover even if we have had a device meeting our requirements we
couldn't have used it because the messages exchange is likely to trigger network
alarms that arouse suspicions in the mobile operator, and even will result in nes
whenever these practices are illegal. For these reasons we could have reverted to
a network simulator but its research resulted only in commercial products because
of the span of its elements coverage |from the phone to the HLR| and the need
to alter the MS default behaviour.
1There is currently the OsmocomBB (http://bb.osmocom.org) aimed at developing an open-
source protocol stack for GSM.
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4.1 Future works
This thesis does not provide a full, in depth analysis of all the problems that the
proposed attack arise but some of them are already under research and are left as
future works. The main target in the near future will be a detailed analysis of the
requirements for the envisioned dedicated device, both in terms of needed hardware
and software, which will help also to denitely justify some of the theoretical results
drawn by this work.2 Some of the questions we are going to answer with this in-
depth analysis are: \is there any needs of dedicated hardware or is it possible to
reuse already available one?"; \from the software point of view have we to develop it
from ground up or is there any leakage/open source project we may take advantage
of?"; \how much expensive is it?"; \what's about power eciency?" and so on.
Other interesting results may be found extending the analysis of the air interface
also to the newest 4G/LTE network, characterized by a new multiple access tech-
nology called Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA), which
may result in ever a lower number of needed attacking devices. Moreover it is
indeed useful, mostly from a protection point of view, to characterize the geo-
graphical extension of the area aected by the attack, determining the jurisdiction
of a single HLR, the total number of cells yonder contained, and thus the ratio of
cells aected by the attack.
2Obviously also trying not to be put in jail in the charge of terrorism.
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